Universe of Platonic Thought 2026

34th International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought: Plato the Architect of Sciences”

Igor Romanovich Tantlevskij, DSc in Philosophy, Professor; Saint Petersburg State University, Institute of Theology (Saint Petersburg, Russia), Head of Department of Jewish Theology and Culture

On the Possible Influence of Plato’s Timaeus 90b1–c7 on the Concluding Scholium of Spinoza’s Ethics*

The paper examines a possible conceptual connection between the concluding scholium to Proposition 42 of Part V of Spinoza’s Ethics and Plato’s Timaeus 90b1–c7. It compares Spinoza’s Latin text with the Latin translations of Plato by Marsilio Ficino and Jean de Serres. The comparison reveals a common contrast between the person governed by passions and oriented toward what is mortal and the wise person whose knowledge is directed toward the eternal and divine. Particular attention is paid to the vocabulary of libido, concupiscentia, ambitiosa iracundia, mens, and animus, as well as to the difference between Ficino’s familiarem daemonem and Serranus’s familiarem deum. The paper advances the hypothesis that the Latin reception of the Timaeus may have influenced the wording of the conclusion of the Ethics.

Keywords: Spinoza; Plato; Ethics; Timaeus; eternity of the mind; immortality; affects; Marsilio Ficino; Jean de Serres

In concluding his principal philosophical work, “Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata” (“Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order”), Spinoza states:

His omnia, quae de mentis in affectus potentia quaeque de mentis libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet, quantum sapiens polleat, potiorque sit ignaro, qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim, praeterquam quod a causis externis multis modis agitatur nec umquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur; sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, numquam esse desinit, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur. Si iam via, quam ad haec ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse, quod adeo raro reperitur. Qui enim posset fieri, si salus in promptu esset et sine magno labore reperiri posset, ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt (V, prop. XLII, schol.).

With this I have completed everything I wished to demonstrate concerning the power of the mind (i.e. the rational soul; mentis[1].—I. T.) over the affects and concerning the freedom of the mind (the rational soul; mentis.—I. T.). From what has been said, it is evident how powerful the wise man is and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven by passionate desire[2]. For the ignorant man, besides being moved in many ways by external causes and never attaining true contentment[3] of soul (animi), lives, moreover, as though unaware of himself, God, and things; and as soon as he ceases to undergo action[4], he also immediately ceases to exist[5]. By contrast, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely affected by any movement of the soul (animo); but, being conscious of himself, God, and things by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to exist, but always possesses true contentment of soul (animi). Although the path which, as I have shown, leads to these things appears exceedingly difficult, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed, that which is so rarely encountered must be difficult. For how could it happen that salvation should be neglected by almost everyone, if it were at hand and could be found without great labor? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare (Part V, prop. 42, scholium).

Thus, Spinoza concludes that the ignorant person, who lives by worldly, perishable, transitory passions, naturally ceases to exist upon the death of the body that indulges in them. The wise person, however, who lives the life of reason and of awareness of himself, the world, and God as eternal realities, is saved; that is, his rational soul does not cease to exist after the death of the flesh.

It seems that this conclusion of Spinoza may have been influenced—perhaps even directly—by a passage from Plato’s Timaeus 90b1–c7 in the Latin translation of Marsilio Ficino and/or Jean de Serres (Johannes Serranus), an edition of one or both of which could well have been available to Spinoza. In Ficino’s translation[6], the text relevant to our discussion reads as follows:

…Qui igitur circa cupiditates vel circa contentiones satagit et magnopere his exercetur, eum opiniones omnes mortales concipere necesse est et omnino, quantum fieri potest, mortalem prorsus evadere, quippe augendo ei, quod huiusmodi est, deditum; qui vero discendi cupiditate et verarum cognitionum studio tenetur, sapere immortalia ac divina, si veritatem attingit, plane necessarium est; quatenus autem humana natura immortalitatis esse particeps potest, eatenus nihil ei deesse, quippe qui semper divinum colat atque daemonem in se habitantem habeat quam optime ornatum, praecipue beatum esse. Cultura autem cuiusque una omnino est: proprium cuique pabulum motumque tribuere.

…Therefore, the person who is wholly engrossed in appetites[7] or rivalries[8] and diligently exercises himself in them necessarily conceives all his opinions as mortal[9] and, so far as possible, himself becomes altogether mortal, since he is devoted to cultivating within himself that which is of this kind—that is, mortal. By contrast, the person who is possessed by a desire for learning and zeal for true knowledge, if he attains the truth, with absolute necessity understands immortal and divine things; and insofar as human nature can partake of immortality, to that extent he lacks nothing, since he always reveres the divine and keeps the daimon[10] dwelling within him in the best possible order, being supremely blessed. The care of each part is in every respect one and the same: to give each its proper nourishment and motion.

In the Latin translation of Jean de Serres[11], this passage reads as follows:

…In eo igitur, qui concupiscentiae et ambitiosae iracundiae affectibus explendis incumbit, necesse est opiniones omnes mortales fieri, atque eum, quam maxime fieri potest, mortalem prorsus evadere, quum mortalem naturam pro viribus auxerit; at eum, qui totus discendae veritatis cupiditate flagraverit atque omnem eius operam praecipue in hoc uno impenderit, necesse est omnino, siquidem veritatem attingat, immortalia et divina comprehendere; et quatenus humana natura immortalitatem assequi potest, eatenus hunc penitus immortalem evadere, nulla videlicet immortalitatis parte dimissa; quin etiam, quum semper divinum colat ipsumque familiarem deum in se habeat ornatissimum, praecipue beatum fore. Cultura autem cuiusque omnino una est: proprium cuique pabulum motumque tribuere.

…Therefore, in the person who devotes himself to satisfying the affects of desire[12]and ambitious anger[13], all opinions necessarily become mortal, and he becomes, so far as possible, wholly mortal, since he has increased his mortal nature to the utmost of his powers. But the person who is wholly aflame with the desire to know the truth and directs all his effort chiefly to this alone, if indeed he attains the truth, with absolute necessity comprehends immortal and divine things; and insofar as human nature can attain immortality, to that extent he becomes wholly immortal, having omitted, of course, no part of immortality. Moreover, since he always reveres the divine and keeps in the best possible order his familiar god[14], who dwells within him, he will be supremely blessed. The care of each part is in every respect one and the same: to give each its proper nourishment and motion.

Let us also note that in the Timaeus 51e Plato states that all human beings partake of opinion, whereas “intellect” (νοῦς) belongs to “the gods” and only to “a small class of human beings”: νοῦ δὲ θεοὺς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. Ficino renders this as intellectus vero deorum est atque paucorum admodum hominum—“intellect, however, belongs to the gods and to very few human beings”; Serranus as illud [sc. mens] diis immortalibus esse peculiare, paulum aliquid ad homines attingere—“the latter [sc. mind] is the peculiar possession of the immortal gods and reaches human beings only to a slight degree”[15].

The comparison reveals a stable Platonic constellation of motifs—subjection to the passions as an orientation toward the mortal, knowledge of the eternal and divine as a path to the form of immortality available to human beings, and blessedness as the result of the proper ordering of the higher principle within the human being—which may have been one of the intellectual sources of the conclusion of Spinoza’s Ethics.

[1] Depending on the context, mens may be interpreted as “mind,” “reason”; “mental faculty” / “thought” / “psyche,” “consciousness”; “spirit,” “soul.” Rendering it as “mind” is justified by Spinoza’s understanding of mens as the idea of the body (see, e.g.: Eth. II, prop. 13).

[2] The Latin libido / lubido derives from libet—“it pleases, one wishes”; its basic semantic range is: “pleasure,” “desire,” “aspiration,” “inclination,” “fancy,” “disposition,” “caprice.” In specialized and pejorative usages it means “disordered desire,” “passion,” “arbitrariness,” “self-will,” “licentiousness,” “lust.” See: Lewis, C. T.; Short, Ch. A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews’ Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879, s.v. “lĭbīdo or lŭbīdo, ĭnis, f.”; Niermeyer, J. F.; van de Kieft, C. Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus: Lexique latin médiéval–français/anglais / A Medieval Latin–French/English Dictionary. 2nd revised ed., revised by J. W. J. Burgers. Vol. 1. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002, s.v. “livido” (= libido). In the present context, libido is better rendered not as “lust” but more broadly as “passionate desire,” or “passion,” since Spinoza is referring to subjection to the affects in general.

[3] Or: “tranquillity.”

[4] In Spinoza, pati here means “to undergo action,” that is, to be passively determined by external causes.

[5] Latin esse: literally, “to be.”

[6] The text is quoted in normalized orthography and punctuation from the printed corpus of M. Ficino’s Latin Plato: Platonis opera a Marsilio Ficino traducta, adiectis ad eius vitae et operum enarrationem Axiocho a Rodolpho Agricola et Alcyone ab Augustino Datho translatis. Parisiis: apud Ioannem Parvum et Iodocum Badium, 1518 [editio princeps: Florentiae, San Jacopo di Ripoli / Laurentius de Alopa, 1484–1485].

[7] Cupiditates may also mean: “desires,” “passions.”

^{^[8]} Contentiones may also mean: “contentions,” “competitions,” “disputes,” “(intense) strivings for superiority.”

[9] That is, opinions directed toward the mortal principle.

[10] On the Platonic conception of the daimon in the Timaeus, see 90a6–b1.

^{^[11]} Platonis Augustiss. Philosophi, omnium quae extant operum, tomus tertius. Graece et Latine, ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione, perpetuis eiusdem notis illustrata. Genevae: Henricus Stephanus, 1578 [editio princeps]. Henri Estienne did not use Ficino’s standard translation, but commissioned de Serres to produce a new Latin translation with commentary.

[12] Concupiscentia: desire, often with a connotation of base passion.

^{^[13]} Ambitiosa iracundia: literally, “ambitious anger”; in context, a passion for rivalry, primacy, and victory, colored by anger. Thus, in speaking of the affects of the two lower parts of the soul, Jean de Serres interprets them as the satisfaction of the passions of desire and ambitious anger, emphasizing the moral-psychological aspect. In Plato’s Greek original, the contrast is between ἐπιθυμίαι—appetites / passionate desires—and φιλονικίαι—the passion for rivalry, love of victory, ambitious competitiveness.

[14] That is, the daimon.

[15] Cf. also, e.g.: Ti. 41c–d; 42b–d; 90c7–d7.

* This study was funded by Russian Science Foundation, project number 24-18-00479, Saint Petersburg State University